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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
ROBERT W. FosTER"
[As stated in the 1963 Survey Issue, "Commercial Transac-
tions" will cover the legal developments relating to the process
of the distribution of personal property. This broad area is di-
vided into sales, chattel security, and commercial paper as the
principal facets of a commercial transaction.]
Sales
In American Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. McKoy-Helgerson Co." the
federal court had before it the construction and application of a;
clause appearing on the reverse side of the seller's price quotation
letter stating that liability for defective material is limited to the
contract price. Subsequently the buyer's purchase order form
was accepted by the seller. In reading all of the documents to-
gether, the court concluded as a matter of law that the limitation
of damage clause was an effective part of the contract and thus
precluded the buyer from recovering consequential damages
resulting from the breach.
- As a general rule, a buyer may recover consequential damages
arising out of breach of a sales contract provided the damages
were foreseeable. 2 As an application of the principle of freedom
of contract, it is clear that the seller may expressly disclaim or
limit normal contract liabilities, provided it is not done by unex-
pected and unbargained for language.4 To prevent an uncon-
scionable imposition of limitation of liability, under some circum-
stances, the court may require that the limiting clause be brought
to the attention of the buyer in order to be effective. 5 Where both
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 226 F. Supp. 842 (W.D.S.C. 1963), ajj'd, 329 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1964).
2. E.g., Georgetown Towing Co. v. National Supply, 204 S.C. 445, 29 S.E.2d
765 (1944) ; Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Conklin, 166 S.C. 400, 164 S.E. 895 (1932).
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715.
3. Sanders v. Allis-Chalmer Mfg. Co., 237 S.C. 133, 115 S.E.2d 793 (1960);
R.C.A. Photophone Co. v. Carroll, 174 S.C. 183, 177 S.E. 23 (1934) ; Deiter
v. Frick Co., 169 S.C. 480, 169 S.E. 297 (1933); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co. v. Glencoe Cotton Mills, 105 S.C. 133, 90 S.E. 526 (1916). See UNIR HU
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(1) (a), approving contractual modification or limi-
tation of remedies except that limitation of consequential damages for injury to
person in the case of consumer goods is "prima facie unconscionable."
4. Durent v. Palmetto Chevrolet Co., 241 S.C. 508, 129 S.E.2d 323 (1963).
5. Ibid. See also Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84,
48 S.E.2d 653 (1948); Stevenson v. Kirkland Seed Co., 175 S.C. 345, 180
S.E. 197 (1935).
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parties to the sales contract are businessmen, as in the American
Cast Iron Pipe Co. case, there is less need and less likelihood
that the court will encroach on the principle of freedom of con-
tract in order to prevent unconscionable terms.
Lynch v. United States Branch, Gen. Aco. Fire & Life Assur.
Corp.,G an action in the federal court to determine liability be-
tween two insurance companies, one a liability insurer of an auto-
mobile dealer and the other a liability insurer of the buyer of a
car, is discussed in the survey of insurance. The outcome in this
case turned on the construction of the term "owned" used in the
buyer's policy as prescribing his insurer's liability. As an indirect
precedent of commercial transactions law relating to the time of
effective transfer of ownership in a car, it is significant that the
court concluded that the buyer became the owner when he took
possession of the car after executing a conditional sales contract
to secure the balance of the purchase price, even though a certifi-
cate of title had not been issued to him. The reserved legal title
in the seller was only a security interest while the equitable title
and ownership passed upon delivery of the car to the buyer. The
South Carolina Motor Vehicle Title Act,7 providing that a trans-
fer by an owner is not effective until its provisions have been
complied with, did not apply to this case under the proviso in the
act, "except-as between the parties."
Chattel Security
The foreclosure procedure after default under a conditional
sales contract covering a truck was challenged in Castell V. Ste-
phenson Fin. Co.8 The mortgagor claimed conversion of the
truck by the secured party in offering it at public sale without
proper notice and by bidding it in at an unconscionably low
price. After concluding that the debtor was in default when the
secured party took possession and that the statutory requirements
of a public sale were complied with,9 the court held that the mere
fact that a sale by the mortgagee results in the property bringing
less than its value would not constitute a conversion.'"
6. 327 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1964).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.15 (1962).
8. 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E.2d 311 (1964).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-164 (1962).
10. For a general discussion of policy regarding judicial supervision of
collateral liquidation sale, see Foster, Commercial Transactions, 16 S.C.L REv.
29, 34 (1963).
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In Layton v. Flowers" the court was asked to overrule the
case of Tate v. Brazier12 holding that the statutory lien on a
motor vehicle for damages resulting from its negligent operation
is superior to the claim of a subsequent bona fide purchaser for
value without notice.13 While the court seems to suggest sym-
pathy for the innocent purchaser, especially since the lien holder
waited some six months before asserting his lien, it nevertheless
felt that it would "exceed the bounds of proper judicial restraint
to overturn a construction which has had implied legislative
sanction . . .,"4 by opportunity and failure to amend over a
long period of time. The court took some of the sting out of this
rule, however, by holding that the lien creditor was estopped
from asserting his interest beyond the value of the car imme-
diately following the collision. The increased value resulting
from extensive repairs during the six months of inaction by the
lienor inured to the benefit of the purchaser. On this latter point,
it is not clear whether the court will limit its application to the
facts of the instant case where the lienor delayed in asserting his
claim thus working an estoppel against him, or whether the stat-
utory lien shall be limited to the value of the car immediately
following the collision in all events.
Commercial Paper
Singletary c6 Son, Inc. v. Lake City State Bank15 involved
the factual pattern of the fraudulent employee who, not having
authority to draw checks, submits a list of names of fictitious
persons to his employer who, believing them to be entitled to
payment, makes checks to their order. The fraudulent employee
then takes the checks, indorses them in the name of the payee,
and the drawee bank, recognizing the drawer's signature, pays
them. In the instant case, the employer-depositor was allowed
to recover the total amount of 14,879 dollars which the bank had
debited against its account on these checks over a period of sev-
11. 243 S.C. 421, 134 S.E.2d 247 (1964).
12. 115 S.C. 283, 104 S.E. 413 (1920).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-551 (1962). See also Merchants & Planters Bank
v. Brigman, 106 S.C. 362, 91 S.E. 332 (1916), where the court held that the
statute creating the "collision lien" was notice to all the world and thus a sub-
sequent chattel mortgagee of a car subject to such lien takes with constructive
notice thereof.
14. Layton v. Flowers, 243 S.C. 421, 424, 134 S.F.2d 247, 248 (1964). See
Powers v. Powers, 239 S.C. 423, 123 S.E.2d 646 (1962) ; Alexander v. Honey-
cutt, 196 S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d 630 (1941).
15. 243 S.C. 180, 133 S.E2d 118 (1963).
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eral years. The principal basis of the decision upholding the
"loan-receipt" device, whereby the plaintiff was paid its losses by
its surety company as a "loan" to be repaid if recovery was had
against the bank, is discussed in the survey of insurance.
The commercial paper aspects of the case involve the bank's
liability to its depositor under these facts which the court seems
to have assumed for the purposes of this appeal. The conventional
analysis of this problem turns on the determination of whether
the check is bearer or order paper. Under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, an instrument is payable to bearer when payable to
a "fictitious or non-existing person and such fact was known
to the person making it."10 The latter phrase is generally con-
strued to mean that the intent of the drawer governs. A check
is bearer if the drawer does not intend the named payee to receive
the beneficial interest; it is order if the drawer does so intend
even though the payee may be fictitious or non-existent. 17 All
of the prior South Carolina cases dealing with the application
of this principle have involved the factual pattern of the fraudu-
lent employee having authority to sign for his employer: the
employee makes checks payable to fictitious persons or other
employees, signs their name as an indorsement, and cashes the
check at the bank where the employer maintained an account.
In those cases it has been held that it was the intention of the
drawer-the fraudulent employee-that the named payees not
receive the beneficial interest and thus the check was bearer.
Since bearer paper is negotiated by physical delivery alone, the
forged indorsements are immaterial and the bank may properly
debit the drawer's account.
In the Singletary case, the employer-drawer intended the
named payee to receive the beneficial interest. Under the analysis
of the negotiable instruments law which makes the drawer's
intent decisive, the check would therefore be order paper. Since
an indorsement is necessary to transfer interest in an order in-
strument, the forgery of the payee's name would pass no right
to receive payment and thus the payee bank could not debit the
drawer's account in the amount so paid. While there are no South
Carolina cases directly in point, this is the usual conclusion
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-820(3) (1962).
17. Southern Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Hale, 241 S.C. 524, 129 S.E2d 420
(1963) ; Bourne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 185 S.C. 1, 192 S.E. 605 (1937); Ellis
Weaving Mills v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 91 F. Supp. 943 (W.D.S.C. 1950),
aff'd, 184 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1950).
[Vol. 17
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss1/7
Com inRcIAL TRANSACTIONS SuRvEYED
reached in other jurisdictions where the matter has arisen", and
may have been assumed by the court in the instant case.
Aside from this conceptual analysis, when the problem is
viewed simply as a matter of visiting loss on either the drawee-
bank or on the employer whose employee caused the loss, the
conclusion that the bank may not debit the drawer's account is
difficult to defend. Presumably, as a reaction against placing
the loss on the drawee bank in either of the fraudulent employee
patterns, the 1964 session of the General Assembly of South
Carolina adopted the American Bankers Association's recom-
mendation of amending the present statute by adding to the
definition of an order instrument in section 8-820(3) of the
South Carolina Code, 1962, the clause: "or known to his em-
ployee or other agent who supplies the name of such payee."
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code would place the loss
on the employer whose faithless employee caused the loss, not
through the bearer-order analysis, but by the direct provision
that "an endorsement by any person in the name of a named
payee is effective if an agent or employee of the maker or drawer
has supplied him with the name of the payee intending the latter
to have no such interest." 19
In Burns v. Prudence Life Ins. Co.20 (commented on in the
survey of insurance) a subsequently dishonored check given to
reinstate a lapsed life insurance policy, was held not to be effec-
tive under the usual presumption that a check is payment only
on condition that it be paid.2 ' The court recognized that the
presumption may be rebutted by an expressed or implied agree-
ment between the parties that the check would be absolute pay-
ment leaving only an action on the check to collect the debt. Even
though the defendant had issued to the insured its receipt, this
was not sufficient to establish the intent of unconditional pay-
ment in light of the fact that the insurer notified the insured who
acknowledged his application for reinstatement that the policy
had lapsed after issuance of the receipt.
The giving of an unconditional receipt stating that the pre-
mium has been paid is usually treated as at least a factor tending
18. E.g., Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651
(1918) ; Commonwealth to use of Coleman v. Farmers Deposit Bank, 264 Ky.
839, 95 S.W.2d 793 (1936).
19. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(c).
20. 243 S.C. 515, 134 S.E.2d 769 (1964).
21. Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barringer, 175 S.C. 145, 178 S.E. 505 (1934);
Holladay v. South Carolina Power Co., 169 S.C. 241, 168 S.E. 691 (1932).
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to show an intent that the check was accepted unconditionally
in satisfaction of the premium. 22 The fact in the instant case
that the insured acknowledged in the reinstatement application
that the policy had lapsed for non-payment of the premium had
the effect of eliminating any inference whereby the jury would
be justified in finding an intention of unconditional acceptance
of the check.
A novel aspect of the tender of payment problem to prevent
the lapse of an automobile liability insurance policy appeared in
Surety Indemnity 0o. V. Estes23 (also commented on in the sur-
vey of insurance). A premium check was dishonored for insuf-
ficient funds when presented by the insurer prior to the expira-
tion of the grace period within which the premium could be paid
to keep the policy in force. Subsequently the insured restored
the account to an amount sufficient to cover the check. Since the
insurer was in possession of the check which it could have col-
lected from the bank before the expiration of the grace period,
this constituted a tender of payments sufficient to prevent for-
feiture.
22. National Life Co. v. Brennecke, 195 Ark. 1088, 115 S.V.2d 185 (1938);
Martin v. New York Ins. Co., 33 N.M. 617, 273 Pac. 1916 (1928).
23. 243 S.C. 593, 135 S.E.2d 226 (1964).
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